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Petrograd on the Eve of Kronstadt

Despite the fact that the population of Petrograd had diminished by two thirds,

the winter of 1920-21 proved to be a particularly hard one.

Food in the city had been scarce since February 1917 and the situation had

deteriorated from month to month. The town had always relied on food stuffs

brought in from other parts of the country. During the Revolution the rural

economy was in crisis in many of these regions. The countryside could only feed

the capital to a very small extent. The catastrophic condition of the railways

made things even worse. The ever increasing antagonisms between town and

country created further difficulties everywhere.

To these partly unavoidable factors must be added the bureaucratic degeneration

of the administration and the rapacity of the State organs for food supply. Their

role in feeding the population was actually a negative one. If the population of

Petrograd did not die of hunger during this period, it was above all thanks to its

own adaptability and initiative. It got food wherever it could!

Barter was practised on a large scale. There was still some food to be had in the

countryside, despite the smaller area under cultivation. The peasant would

exchange this produce for the goods he lacked: boots, petrol, salt, matches. The

population of the towns would try and get hold of these commodities in any way

it could. They alone had real value. It would take them to the country side. In

exchange people would carry back a few pounds of flour or potatoes. As we have

mentioned before, the few trains, unheated, would be packed with men carrying

bags on their shoulders. En root, the trains would often have to stop because they

had run out of fuel. Passengers would get off and cut logs for the boilers.

Market places had officially been abolished. But in nearly all towns there were

semi tolerated illegal markets, where barter was carried out. Such markets

existed in Petrograd. Suddenly, in the Summer of 1920, Zinoviev issued a decree

forbidding any kind of commercial transaction. The few small shops still open

were closed and their doors sealed. However, the State apparatus was in no

position to supply the towns. From this moment on, famine could no longer be

attenuated by the initiative of the population. It became extreme. In January

1921, according to information published by Petrokommouns (the State Supplies

of the town of Petrograd), workers in metal smelting factories were allocated

rations of 800 grams of black bread a day; shock workers in other factories 600

grams; workers with A.V. cards: 400 grams; other workers: 200 grams. Black

bread was the staple diet of the Russian people at this time.

But even these official rations were distributed irregularly and in even smaller

amounts than those stipulated. Transport workers would receive, at irregular

intervals, the equivalent of 700 to 1,000 calories a day. Lodgings were unheated.

There was a great shortage of both clothing and footwear. According to official

statistics, working class wages in 1920 in Petrograd were only 9 per cent. of

those in 1913.

The population was drifting away from the capital. All who had relatives in the

country had rejoined them. The authentic proletariat remained till the end, having

the most slender connections with the countryside.

It was the Petrograd proletariat, the same proletariat which had played such a

leading role in both previous revolutions, that was finally to resort to the classical

weapon of the class struggle: the strike.

The first strike broke out at the Troubotchny factory, on 23rd February 1921. On

the 24th, the strikers organised a mass demonstration in the street. Zinovlev

sent detachments of 'Koursanty' (student officers) against them. The strikers

tried to contact the Finnish Barracks. Meanwhile, the strikes were spreading. The

Baltisky factory stopped work. Then the Laferma factory and a number of others:

the Skorokhod shoe factory, the Admiralteiski factory, the Bormann and

Metalischeski plants, and finally, on 28th February, the great Putilov works

itself.

The strikers were demanding measures to assist food supplies. Some factories

were demanding the re-establishment of the local markets, freedom to travel

within a radius of thirty miles of the city, and the withdrawal of the militia

detachments holding the road around the town. But side by side with these

economic demands. several factories were putting forward more political

demands freedom of speech and of the Press, the freeing of working class

political prisoners. In several big factories, Party spokesmen were refused a

hearing.

On 24th February the Committee of Defence proclaimed a state of siege was declared

by the Bolshevik officials in Petrograd. All circulation on the streets was forbidden

after 11 PM, as were all meetings and gatherings, both out of doors and indoors,

that had not been specifically permitted by the '(Bolshevik) Defence Committee. '

All infringements would be dealt with according to military law.'

The decree was signed by Avrov (later shot by the Stalinists), Commander of the Petrograd

military region, by Lachevitch (who later committed suicide), a member of the War Council,

and by Bouline (later shot by the Stalinists), Commander of the fortified Petrograd District.

A general mobilisation of party members was decreed. Special detachments were

created, to be sent to "special destinations". At the same time, the militia

detachments guarding the roads in and out of the town were withdrawn. Then the

strike leaders were arrested.

On 26th February the Kronstadt sailors, naturally interested in all that was going

on in Petrograd, sent delegates to find out about the strikes. The delegation

visited a number factories. It returned to Kronstadt on the 28th. That same day,

the crew of the battleship 'Petropavlovsk,' having discussed the situation, voted

the following resolution: (2)

Having heard the reports of the representatives sent by the General

Assembly of the Fleet to find out about the situation in Petrograd,

the sailors demand:

1.immediate new elections to the Soviets. The present Soviets

no longer express the wishes of the workers and peasants. The

new elections should be by secret ballot, and should be

preceded by free electoral propaganda.

2.Freedom of speech and of the press for workers and peasants,

for the Anarchists, and for the Left Socialist parties.

3.The right of assembly, and freedom for trade union and

peasant organisations.

4.The organisation, at the latest on 10th March 1921, of a

Conference of non-Party workers, solders and sailors of

Petrograd, Kronstadt and the Petrograd District.

5.The liberation of all political prisoners of the Socialist

parties, and of all imprisoned workers and peasants, soldiers

and sailors belonging to working class and peasant

organisations.

6.The election of a commission to look into the dossiers of all

those detained in prisons and concentration camps.

7.The abolition of all political sections in the armed forces. No

political party should have privileges for the propagation of

its ideas, or receive State subsidies to this end. In the place

of the political sections various cultural groups should be set

up, deriving resources from the State.

8.The immediate abolition of the militia detachments set up

between towns and countryside.

9.The equalisation of rations for all workers, except those

engaged in dangerous or unhealthy jobs.

10.The abolition of Party combat detachments in all military

groups. The abolition of Party guards in factories and

enterprises. If guards are required, they should be nominated,

taking into account the views of the workers.

11.The granting to the peasants of freedom of action on their

own soil, and of the right to own cattle, provided they look

after them themselves and do not employ hired labour.

12.We request that all military units and officer trainee groups

associate themselves with this resolution.

13.We demand that the Press give proper publicity to this

resolution.

14.We demand the institution of mobile workers' control groups.

15.We demand that handicraft production be authorised provided

it does not utilise wage labour.

The Kronstadt sailors and the Petrograd strikers knew quite well that Russia's

economic status was at the root of the political crisis. Their discontent was

caused both by the famine and by the whole evolution of the political situation.

The Russian workers were increasingly disillusioned in their greatest hope: the

Soviets. Daily they saw the power of a single Party substituting itself for that of

the Soviets. A Party, moreover, which was degenerating rapidly through the

exercise of absolute power, and which was already riddled with careerists. It

was against the monopoly exercised by this Party in all fields of life that the

working class sought to react.

The Kronstadt revolution had the merit of stating things openly and clearly. But

it was breaking no new ground. Its main ideas were being discussed everywhere.

For having, in one way or another, put forward precisely such ideas, workers and

peasants were already filling the prisons and the recently set up concentration

camps. The men of Kronstadt did not desert their comrades. Point six of their

resolution shows that they intended to look into the whole juridical apparatus.

They already had serious doubts as to its objectivity as an organ of their rule.

The Kronstadt sailors were thereby showing a spirit of solidarity in the best

working class tradition.

The Baltic sailors of 1921 were, it is true, closely linked with the peasantry.

But neither more so nor less than had been the sailors of 1917.

In their resolution, the Kronstadt sailors were taking up once again one of the big

demands of October. They were supporting those peasant claims demanding the

land and the right to own cattle for those peasants who did not exploit the labour

of others. In 1921, moreover, there was another aspect to this particular demand.

It was an attempt to solve the food question, which was becoming desperate.

Under the system of forced requisition, the population of the towns was literally

dying of hunger. Why, incidentally, should the satisfaction of these demands be

deemed 'tactically correct' when advocated by Lenin, in March 1921, and 'counter

revolutionary' when put forward by the peasants themselves a few weeks

earlier?

The majority of the members of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee were

sailors with a long service. This contradicts the official version of the Kronstadt

events, which seeks to attribute the leadership of the revolt to elements

recently joining the Navy and having nothing in common with the heroic sailors of

1917-1919.

The first proclamation of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee stated: 'We

are concerned to avoid bloodshed. Our aim is to create through the joint efforts

of town and fortress the proper conditions for regular and honest elections to the

new soviet.'

Later that day, under the leadership of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee,

the inhabitants of Kronstadt occupied all strategic points in the town, taking

over the State establishments, the Staff Headquarters, and the telephone and

wireless buildings. Committees were elected in all battleships and regiments. At

about 9:00 p.m., most of the forts and most detachments of the Red Army had

rallied. Delegates coming from Oranienbaum had also declared their support for

the Provisional Revolutionary Committee. That same day the 'Izvestia' printshops

were occupied.